In a decision which examines the interplay between copyright, moral rights and patents, the Court of Appeal in Veronica Sainik @ Ronald v Meluha Life Sciences Sdn Bhd & Ors [2026] 3 MLJ 700 has demonstrated how unauthorised use of academic work can give rise to consequences extending far beyond what might ordinarily be viewed as mere university disciplinary matters or academic misconduct.

Veronica Sainik @ Ronald (“Veronica“) was enrolled as a Master’s student at the Faculty of Dentistry, University of Malaya (“UM“). Meluha Life Sciences Sdn Bhd is a biotechnology company and industry collaborator with UM, whilst the second and third defendants were researchers associated with UM (collectively “Defendants“).

As part of her postgraduate studies, Veronica was involved in a collaborative research project aimed, amongst other things, at developing UM’s expertise in stem cell research through postgraduate programmes. The research data was later incorporated by Veronica into her Master’s dissertation where, as part of the University’s academic requirements, Veronica assigned the copyright in her dissertation to UM.

Veronica later discovered that her work during the project was used by the Defendants in patent applications filed in Malaysia and the United States without acknowledgement to her. This led to proceedings being commenced alleging, inter alia, infringement of her moral rights under section 25 of the Copyright Act 1987 (“CA 1987“) and for the invalidation of Malaysian Patent No. MY-166810-A entitled “Isolation, Expansion and Characterization of Precursor/Stem Cells from Dental Tissues” (“the Patent“).

Notwithstanding the assignment of copyright to UM, the High Court found that Veronica, as the author of the dissertation, continued to enjoy the moral rights of paternity and integrity under sections 25(2)(a) and (b) of the CA 1987 respectively. However, the High Court took the view that there was no evidence of infringement of her moral rights, finding that there had been no distortion or significant alteration of the dissertation and no evidence that Veronica’s honour or reputation had been adversely affected.

The Court of Appeal, however, found that substantial portions of Veronica’s dissertation had been reproduced in the Patent without identifying her as the author, thereby infringing her right of paternity. More interestingly, the Court also observed that while the factual data contained in Veronica’s dissertation had largely been reproduced, aspects of the methodology was modified to support certain scientific assertions which were made in the Patent.

The Court of Appeal was of the view that these modifications, coupled with the failure to properly attribute Veronica’s authorship, adversely affected her standing and credibility as an academic researcher, whose professional reputation depended heavily upon proper acknowledgement and accurate representation of her work.

As such, the Court of Appeal awarded Veronica damages and costs totalling RM 250,000.00 and declared the Patent invalid for lack of novelty, holding that Veronica’s dissertation constituted novelty destroying prior art.

This decision is a welcomed affirmation that an author’s moral rights will survive the assignment of copyright and remain independently enforceable by an author. However, it also raises a number of interesting questions regarding the scope of those rights, particularly that in relation to the right of paternity.

In reaching its conclusion that Veronica’s right of paternity had been infringed, the Court appears to have placed considerable emphasis on the absence of proper attribution and the modifications made to the presentation of her research. However, in an academic environment where new research routinely builds upon existing literature and prior findings, the boundary between the unlawful modification of a work and legitimate academic reliance remains far from clear.

After all, copyright protects the originality of an author’s expression rather than ideas, facts or data themselves. Multiple authors may each enjoy copyright in different original works even though they communicate the same underlying scientific information or data.

Further, when scientific research is involved, where should the line be drawn between uncopyrightable factual information and original works protected by copyright and moral rights? More importantly, would litigants increasingly invoke moral rights as an alternative avenue of relief even after assigning away their copyright?

The Court of Appeal’s finding on the invalidation of the Patent is also thought-provoking. Its finding that the Patent lacked novelty appears, at least in part, to have been influenced by its earlier conclusion that substantial portions of Veronica’s dissertation had been reproduced in the Patent. However, copyright infringement and anticipation for the purpose of destroying novelty are conceptually quite distinct.

Copyright considers whether a substantial part of an author’s original expression has been reproduced without permission. Patent invalidation on the basis of lack of novelty, by contrast, considers whether the elements claimed in a patent has been disclosed in a single piece of prior art before the relevant priority date. A work may therefore be substantially copied for copyright purposes without necessarily anticipating a patent claim, just as a relatively small disclosure may destroy novelty if it discloses every integer of the claimed invention.

This therefore raises an interesting question. Did the Court observe that the copied portions of the dissertation happened also to disclose every essential element of the patented invention, or does this finding give rise to potential arguments which may risk conflating the copyright concept of substantial reproduction with anticipation under patent law?

There is also a broader issue which the decision implicitly touches upon. For Veronica’s dissertation to constitute novelty-destroying prior art, it must have been available to the public before the Patent’s priority date. Public accessibility and not the mere the existence of a document is ordinarily the touchstone in determining prior art. As such, can the mere submission of a dissertation to a university – which may or may not be accessible by the public – be the basis upon a patent can be invalidated? Would access to specific members of the faculty alone amount to access by the public?

Ultimately, this decision serves as a reminder that intellectual property rights do not operate in isolation. A single piece of academic research may simultaneously engage copyright, moral rights and patent law, each governed by distinct legal principles.

While the Court of Appeal has definitely provided welcomed guidance on the protection of authors’ moral rights notwithstanding an assignment of copyright, other questions remain and will no doubt continue to be debated. Until then, this decision will represent an important and thought-provoking addition to Malaysia’s continuing development of intellectual property jurisprudence.