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The abolition of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) via the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, necessitated a remodelling of intellectual property litigation in India. By routing appeals from IP offices back to the High Courts, several statutory paradoxes emerged.

 

One of the critical questions that has frequently been adjudicated upon is the maintainability of  Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) against orders passed by a Single Judge of a High Court arising out of the decisions of the Registrar under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

 

Statutory Interplay: Section 100A CPC vs. Clause 15 of Letters Patent

 

The primary hurdle often raised against the maintainability of an LPA is Section 100A of The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), which bar a further intra-court appeal, where an appeal from an original or appellate decree or order has been heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court. Introduction of Section 100 A was a legislative attempt to curb procedural delays, reduce judicial backlog and prevent endless appeals.

 

A strict textual analysis of Clause 15 of Letters Patent of Madras High Court permits an appeal to the High Court from the judgment of a Single Judge, excluding judgments passed in the exercise of second appellate jurisdiction, revisional jurisdiction, or criminal jurisdiction. While this clause is partly rendered redundant by Section 100A of CPC, it does not appear to blanketly extinguish intra-court appeals arising from statutory authorities.

 

The operation of Section 100A CPC is explicitly conditional upon the existence of a “decree or order” passed under the framework of CPC. For Section 100A to bar an LPA, the primary adjudication must emerge from a Civil Court, for which one must examine the definitions of “Order” and “Decree” under CPC:

 

1. Section 2(14) CPC defines an “order” as the formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree.
2. Section 2(2) CPC defines a “decree” as the formal expression of an adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the parties within a suit in a Civil Court.

Is Registrar of Trademarks a “Civil Court”:

 

Jurisprudential consensus across Courts is divided on whether Registrar possess the status of a Civil Court:

1.     Supreme Court of India: In Khoday Distilleries Limited v. Scotch Whisky Association, Apex court categorically ruled that the Registrar is a statutory, quasi-judicial authority and is not a court.

2.     Delhi High Court: Affirmed in Promoshirt SM SA v. Armassuisse, holding that the Registrar of Trademarks cannot be equated to a civil court.

3.     Bombay High Court: Maintained in Vishal Prafulsingh Solanke and Anr. V. Controller of Patents and Designs and Ors that the Powers of the Controller is much more significant than that of the Registrar and that the Controller would therefore have the trappings of the Court unlike the Registrar.

4.     Calcutta High Court: While interpreting the maintainability of LPA’s in Glorious Investment Limited v Dunlop International Limited held that Registrar has trappings of a Civil Court.

 

Historical Necessity of Four Levels of Appeal

 

A major equitable argument in favour of maintaining LPAs is the historical continuity of judicial remedies. Prior to the establishment of the IPAB, and notably during its operational tenure, intellectual property litigants consistently relied upon a robust four-layer appellate hierarchy:

 

Before 2021 tribunal reforms, an intellectual property litigant therefore had access to a four-tier review. With the abolition of the IPAB and the subsequent redirection of these disputes back to the High Courts, removing the intra-court appeal to a Division Bench would inadvertently shrink the appellate ladder, stripping litigants of an intermediate layer of judicial review.

 

This forces them to leap directly from a Single Judge to the Supreme Court under Article 136, a discretion that Supreme Court would be hesitant to exercise unless there is a grave error of law.

Jurisdictional rift among Commercial Divisions

 

The lack of an explicit roadmap post-IPAB abolition has resulted in diverging viewpoints across India’s leading Commercial Divisions. While Delhi High Court has taken a pro-maintainability stand; Calcutta High Court and Bombay High Cout have taken a stricter interpretation of Section 100 A which bars intra-court appeals from statutory appeals from quasi-judicial bodies. 

 

Madras High Court while holding that Original Suit appeals from orders passed by a Single Judge of a High Court arising out of the decisions of the Controller, would be barred under Section 13, has also admitted and listed several such LPA’s, agreeing with the interpretations of Delhi High Court regarding its maintainability.

 

Applicability of Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (CCA)

 

Another layer of complexity emerges as some of the appeals from Judgement or Orders of the Single Judge are being filed under Section 13 of the CCA, which restrictively applies only to orders provided for under Order 43 of CPC.

 

It is important to consider if the provisions of the CCA would even apply to such statutory appeals being filed in relation to decisions of the Registrar under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 when several of the High Courts have specifically notified their respective Intellectual Property Dispute Rules.  

 

This position was clarified by the Division Bench of Madras High Court, vide order dated 12.12.2025, where it was held that “restriction against an Intra-court appeal contemplated under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 will not apply to the decisions rendered by this Court in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred under a special statute especially in Intellectual Property Division such as the matters arising out of the Trademarks Act, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, etc…”.

 

It would be interesting to see if the same arguments would apply for orders from the Controller of Patents, as there have been interpretations that the powers of the Controller are wider and would be considered as having “trappings of a Court”.

 

Supreme Court to iron out contradictions

 

The chaotic intersection of these provisions has produced a jurisdictional rift, creating unequal avenues of redress for litigants depending on geographic jurisdiction and the Supreme Court may soon be called upon to iron out these issues.

 

Intellectual property rights have nationwide and cross-border implications and having an LPA maintainable in Chennai or Delhi, but barred in Kolkata or Mumbai, creates an unsustainable environment of forum shopping. A uniform declaration by the Supreme Court would align the procedural rules of all High Courts, ensuring predictable access to all domestic and international litigants.